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Abstract
Adversarial examples have received a great deal of recent attention because of their
potential to uncover security flaws in machine learning systems. However, most prior work
on adversarial examples has been on parametric classifiers, for which generic attack and
defense methods are known; non-parametric methods have been only considered on an ad-
hoc or classifier-specific basis. In this work, we take a holistic look at adversarial examples
for non-parametric methods. We first provide a general region-based attack that applies to
a wide range of classifiers, including nearest neighbors, decision trees, and random forests.
Motivated by the close connection between non-parametric methods and the Bayes Optimal
classifier, we next exhibit a robust analogue to the Bayes Optimal, and we use it to motivate
a novel and generic defense that we call adversarial pruning. We empirically show that the
region-based attack and adversarial pruning defense are either better than or competitive
with existing attacks and defenses for non-parametric methods, while being considerably
more generally applicable.
1 Introduction
State-of-the-art classifiers have been shown to suffer from substantial drops in accuracy when
faced with adversarially modified inputs even if the modifications are imperceptibly slight. Due
to the security concerns that this raises, a significant amount of research has investigated the
construction and prevention of adversarial examples, which are small perturbations of valid
inputs that cause misclassification [10, 27, 59]. Most prior work has looked at parametric
methods, such as deep neural networks and linear classifiers [5, 42, 43, 50, 53]. There is now
a reasonably mature understanding of adversarial examples for any parametric model. For
example, there are multiple strong gradient-based attacks [3, 12]. Likewise, an effective and
generic defense for parametric models is adversarial training, retraining after data augmentation
with adversarial examples [11, 56, 43, 58].
∗Equal contribution.
1
An alternative machine learning paradigm is that of non-parametric methods, such as nearest
neighbor, decision tree, and random forest classifiers. These are local predictors, and their
output depends on labeled points in the region around an input instance. Surprisingly, these
methods seem to behave very differently from parametrics when it comes to adversarial examples.
In many cases, they have no gradients, and adversarial examples for parametric models fail to
transfer [48]. Generic defenses, such as adversarial training, appear to be ineffective for non-
parametric methods [25, 47, 61]. While prior work has constructed attacks and defenses for
some specific classifiers [15, 25, 34, 47, 57, 61], there appear to be no generic approaches that
apply to a wide range of non-parametric methods.
In this work, we address this problem by providing generic attacks and defenses for a large
class of non-parametric classifiers. We begin with the key observation that many non-parametric
methods divide the instance space into convex polyhedra, and they predict in a piecewise
constant manner on each region. This suggests the following attack: find the closest polyhedron
to an input where the classifier predicts a different label and output the closest point in this
region. As our first contribution, we implement this strategy by solving a collection of convex
programs, and we prove that it finds the optimal adversarial example (in any norm, e.g., ℓp
distance, p ≥ 1). For some classifiers, such as random forests, the computational cost of solving
all of the programs may be too high. In these cases, we provide a heuristic method for finding an
approximate solution by only searching over a subset of the polyhedra. We show experimentally
that this still leads to a highly-effective attack. We refer to these two new attacks as the exact
and approximate region-based attack.
Moving on to defenses, we draw inspiration from classical statistical learning theory, which
establishes that many non-parametric methods converge to the Bayes Optimal classifier in the
large sample limit, provided that certain conditions hold. However, the Bayes Optimal classifier
may not be robust against adversarial perturbations, even if number of samples goes to infinity.
Hence, we pose the following question: In the large sample limit, what is the robust analogue of
the Bayes Optimal classifier?
Our second contribution is to provide such an analogue. For a robustness parameter r, we
call it the r-Optimal classifier. We prove that it maximizes accuracy at points where it is robust
to distance r adversarial perturbations. The core of the proof shows that this robust version of
accuracy can be expressed in terms of certain subsets of the input space, where these subsets
will have pairwise distance at least 2r.
As our third contribution, we propose a finite-sample approximation of the r-Optimal clas-
sifier. Our approach will be to train a non-parametric classifier after preprocessing the training
data. The intuition is that if instances with different labels are far apart, then the resulting
classifier will estimate the decision regions of the r-Optimal classifier. We propose to train using
the maximal subset of training data such that differently-labeled points are distance 2r apart.
As this approach only modifies the training data, it applies to any non-parametric method. We
call this new generic defense adversarial pruning.
Finally, we empirically evaluate the region-based attack and adversarial pruning defense on
k-nearest neighbors (k-NN), decision trees, and random forests. Our new attacks outperform
prior attacks for 1-NN and 3-NN, often being 2-3x better than previous work. Our approximate
attack is competitive with previous attacks for random forests. In terms of defenses, adver-
sarial pruning consistently improves robustness, outperforming adversarial training on several
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real and synthetic datasets. It is also competitive with classifier-specific defenses and usually
leads to 200-300% higher robustness compared to undefended methods. Overall, adversarial
pruning appears to be an effective and generic defense for non-parametric classifiers, much like
adversarial training is for parametric methods.
Our results raise an interesting and largely unexplored question: Why do non-parametric
methods seem to require such different attacks and defenses compared to parametrics? We
believe that this is partly because they use training data in a fundamentally different manner.
Parametrics are global methods, and they excel at constructing decision boundaries that fit all
of the data, including the points close to the boundary. In contrast, non-parametric methods
are decidedly local predictors, and they have a tendency to create decision boundaries that
neglect low-density regions of the input space. We leave a formal explanation of this dichotomy
as an intriguing direction for future work.
1.1 Related Work
The bulk of research on adversarially robust classifiers has focused on parametric models, with
many generic attacks [12, 41, 49, 50, 59], as well as defenses [32, 35, 43, 51, 53, 56]. In contrast,
adversarial examples for non-parametrics have been studied in a more case-by-case basis.
For decision trees and tree ensembles, Kantchelian et. al. [34] formulate an optimal attack
as a Mixed Integer Linear Program (superseding an earlier attack [48]) and prove NP-Hardness
for a growing number of trees. Chen et. al. [15] provide an algorithm to increase the robustness
of boosted tree ensembles by improving the node-splitting process.
For k-NN, prior work on adversarial examples only considers suboptimal attacks, such the
direct attack and variants thereof [2, 57, 61]. Concurrent work [36] on Voronoi-based adversarial
training for neural networks also introduces the optimal attack for 1-NN (i.e., Region-Based
attack restricted to 1-NN). In terms of defenses, Wang et. al. [61] increase 1-NN robustness by
strategically removing training points. Besides only testing 1-NN against suboptimal attacks,
Wang et. al. do not consider applying their defense method to other non-parametrics. Also,
in the infinite sample limit, their approach converges to the Bayes Optimal classifier, whereas
adversarial pruning approximates the r-Optimal classifier. Our attack and defense methods are
thus more general than these prior works.
Outside the realm of adversarial examples, pruning-based approaches have been used to
improve the accuracy and generalization (but not robustness) of 1-NN [26, 28, 31, 37, 38].
Related attacks and defenses have been developed for ReLU networks [17, 21, 33, 39, 54, 55,
60, 63]. Overall, these results do not directly pertain to non-parametrics, as the ReLU models are
fundamentally different. The geometric attacks and defenses are similar in spirit to ours, using
that ReLU networks can also be decomposed into convex decision regions. Optimizations based
on the dual formulation may improve the efficiency of our methods as well [60, 63]. In terms of
robustness, it would be interesting to better understand the relationship between our defense
method (adversarial pruning) and the ReLU defense methods and robustness certificates [21,
33, 55]. For example, do robust ReLU networks approximate or converge to the r-Optimal
classifier?
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1.2 Preliminaries
Non-parametric classifiers are local methods whose output depends on training data that are
close to the test instance. Canonical examples include k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) and tree-
based classifiers. The k-NN classifier outputs the plurality label among the k training examples
closest to x in ℓ2 distance. A tree ensemble contains T decision trees whose leaves are labeled
with vectors in RC . Each input x determines T root-to-leaf paths, corresponding to vectors
u1, . . . ,uT . The output is the largest coordinate in u1+ · · ·+uT . Random forests are a popular
subclass of tree ensembles.
In what follows, we let f : Rd → [C] denote a classifier with C classes, where we define
[C] := {1, 2, . . . , C}. The training data for f will be a dataset S = {(xj , yj)}nj=1 of n labeled
examples, with xj ∈ Rd and yj ∈ [C].
Robustness. We study robustness in an adversarial model. The adversary’s goal is to modify
a true input by a small amount and cause the classifier to output the wrong label. Two
main threat models have been proposed. The black-box setting restricts the adversary to only
querying a classifier f on various inputs. In the white-box setting, the adversary has full access
to f , including the model structure and parameters. For k-NN, the white-box setting necessarily
reveals the training set.
More formally, fix a classifier f and a norm ‖ · ‖ on Rd. An adversarial example for f at x
is any other input x˜ such that f(x) 6= f(x˜). An optimal adversarial example for f at x is an
input x˜ that minimizes ‖x− x˜‖ subject to f(x) 6= f(x˜). In other words, an optimal adversarial
example x˜ is a closest vector to x that receives a different label. In practice it is not always
possible to find the optimal adversarial example, and hence the goal is to find x˜ that is as close
to x as possible. We also define the robustness radius, the minimum perturbation needed to
change the classifier label (although we state the general definition, we usually take X = Rd).
Definition 1. Let X × [C] be a labeled space with norm ‖ · ‖. The robustness radius of f at
x ∈ X is
ρ(f,x) := min
x˜∈X
{‖x− x˜‖ : f(x) 6= f(x˜)}
2 Region-Based Attack
The main challenge of finding adversarial examples for non-parametric methods is that these
classifiers have complicated decision regions, especially in high-dimensional spaces. The central
idea behind our attack is that for many non-parametric classifiers, such as k-NN or random
forests, we can explicitly decompose the decision regions into convex sets. The following defini-
tion makes this precise.
Definition 2. An (s,m)-decomposition is a partition of Rd into convex polyhedra P1, . . . , Ps
such that each Pi can be described by at most m linear constraints. We say that a classifier f
is (s,m)-decomposable if there exists an (s,m)-decomposition such that f is constant on Pi for
each i ∈ [s].
A familiar example is when f is a 1-NN classifier. The Voronoi diagram for an n point dataset
is an (n, n − 1)-decomposition, where the polyhedra P1, . . . , Pn are the Voronoi cells. For any
k ≥ 1, a k-NN classifier is
((
n
k
)
, k(n− k)
)
-decomposable; each set of k points corresponds to the
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polyhedron that is defined by the k(n− k) hyperplanes separating the k points from the other
n− k points (this decomposition is known as the kth-order Voronoi diagram [4, 30]).
Tree-based classifiers also fit into this framework. Any decision tree of depth D with L
leaves is (L,D)-decomposable; each root-to-leaf path corresponds to a polyhedron Pi defined by
D hyperplanes. More generally, if f is an ensemble of T trees, each with depth D and L leaves,
then f is (LT ,DT )-decomposable. Note that an exponential dependence on T is expected, since
the adversarial example problem for tree ensembles is known to be NP-Hard [34].
As these decompositions for k-NN and tree ensembles are either well-known or rather
straightforward, we defer the proofs to Appendix A.
2.1 Optimal Attack Algorithm
The existence of (s,m)-decompositions suggests the following attack for non-parametric meth-
ods. Given a classifier f and an input x, suppose we could find the closest polyhedron Pi in
the decomposition where f predicts a different label than f(x). Then, the closest point in Pi
would be the optimal adversarial example for f at x. Our attack implements this strategy by
searching over all polyhedra in the decomposition.
Region-Based Attack. Let f be an (s,m)-decomposable classifier with decomposition P1, . . . , Ps,
where f(z) = yi whenever z ∈ Pi, for labels y1, . . . , ys ∈ [C]. To find an adversarial example
for x, consider all polyhedra Pi such that f(x) 6= yi. Then, output x˜ minimizing
min
i:f(x)6=yi
min
z∈Pi
‖x− z‖. (1)
By definition, each Pi can be described by at most m linear constraints, and it is well-known
that the norm objective is convex [6]. Therefore, we can solve each inner minimization problem
in (1) separately by solving a convex program with O(m) constraints. This results in candi-
dates zi ∈ Pi. Taking the outer minimum over i with f(x) 6= yi leads to the optimal adversarial
example x˜ = argmin
zi ‖x− z
i‖.
The time complexity of the attack clearly depends on the norm. We focus on the ℓp norms,
with p ∈ {1, 2,∞}, because these are the most relevant for adversarial examples. That being
said, the above discussion establishes the following theorem (the proof appears in Appendix A).
Theorem 1. If f : Rd → [C] is an (s,m)-decomposable classifier, then the region-based attack
outputs the optimal adversarial example in time s ·poly(m,d), for the ℓp distance, p ∈ {1, 2,∞}.
As k-NN and tree ensembles are (s,m)-decomposable classifiers (for certain s and m values,
depending on the classifier), the region-based attack produces an optimal adversarial example
in these cases. An important aspect of an optimal attack is that it certifies the robustness
radius. Indeed, if on input x the region-based attack outputs x˜, then ‖x− x˜‖ = ρ(f,x).
Not surprisingly, the optimal attack will be computationally intensive when the number of
polyhedra s is large. Hence, finding the optimal solution may be infeasible for random forests
(with many trees) or k-NN (when k is large). To ameliorate this, we provide a computationally-
efficient approximation algorithm in Section 2.2.
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Remark (Targeted Attack). So far, we have considered untargeted attacks, allowing adversarial
examples to have any label other than f(x). An important variation is a targeted attack, which
specifies a label ℓ ∈ [C], and the goal is to output a close point x˜ with f(x˜) = ℓ. The region-
based attack can be easily modified for this. Let yi be the label that f predicts on all points in
polyhedron Pi for i ∈ [s]. Then, the targeted attack only searches over Pi with yi = ℓ.
2.2 Speeding Up the Search
The region-based attack for an (s,m)-decomposable classifier requires solving up to s convex
programs, one for each polyhedron Pi with a different label. For some classifiers, the number
of polyhedra may be prohibitively large, leading to a computationally infeasible attack. For-
tunately, problem (1) has an obvious subdivision, based on the outer minimum over convex
polyhedra. We therefore suggest the relaxation that considers only a subset of polyhedra. We
observe that each training point corresponds to a polyhedron—the one that f uses to predict
the label. Hence, when finding adversarial examples for x, a natural choice is to use data close
to x.
Approximate Region-Based Attack. Let f be an (s,m)-decomposable classifier, and let S
be the training data. To find an adversarial example under ℓp distance for f at x, we first
compute the subset S ′ ⊆ S of s′ training points that are closest in ℓp distance to x, while
having different predictions than f(x). In other words, compute the s′ closest points to x from
the set {z ∈ S | f(z) 6= f(x)}. Next, recall that the polyhedra P1, . . . , Ps in the decomposition
for f form a partition of the whole space Rd. Therefore, each point z ∈ S ′ is contained in some
polyhedron, and the entirety of S ′ is contained in the union of at most s′ polyhedra {Pij} for
indices ij ∈ [s] with j ≤ s
′. Observe that the definition of S ′ guarantees that there exists at
least one point in each Pij where f predicts a different label than f(x). Since f is constant on
each polyhedron in the decomposition, we have that z ∈ Pij implies that f(z) 6= f(x).
We find an adversarial example for x by searching over this subset {Pij} of polyhedra. We
solve the inner optimization problem in (1) for each Pij to find candidates z
j ∈ Pij for j ≤ s
′.
We output x˜ = argmin
zj ‖x− z
j‖, where the minimum is over these (at most) s′ candidates.
To execute this approximate attack, we solve at most s′ ≪ s convex programs. Therefore,
the running time is greatly reduced compared to the optimal region-based attack. We also note
that this attack still finds valid adversarial example for any input; that is, the output x˜ always
satisfies f(x˜) 6= f(x). Even though the attack is approximate, we show empirically that it
efficiently finds adversarial examples, often with much lower perturbation than prior attacks.
Remark (Exact vs. Approximate Attack). Note that on a training set of size n, it does not
suffice to set s′ = n to recover the exact attack. Indeed, for many classifiers, the number of
polyhedra s will be much greater than n, and the vast majority of these regions do not contain
any training data. In particular, the optimal adversarial example may be in such a region.
We leave it as an interesting open question to interpolate between the exact and approximate
region-based attacks. For example, maybe it suffices to consider the polyhedra that neighbor
those containing training data, while still searching over much fewer than all s polyhedra.
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3 Adversarial Pruning Defense
We devise a general defense for non-parametrics, inspired by classical results in statistical learn-
ing theory [14, 20, 22]. Under certain conditions, many non-parametric methods converge in the
infinite sample limit to the Bayes Optimal classifier, the most accurate classifier for a data dis-
tribution. In this way, non-parametric classifiers may be viewed as finite-sample approximations
to the Bayes Optimal.
Although the Bayes Optimal may not be robust to adversarial examples, we can still follow
an updated version of the classical strategy. First, we derive a robust analogue to the Bayes
Optimal. For perturbation amount r, we call it the r-Optimal classifier. Then, we propose an
analogous hypothesis: approximating the r-Optimal Classifier with a non-parametric method
will result in a robust classifier. To test this hypothesis, we introduce a novel defense method,
which we call adversarial pruning.
3.1 Robust Analogue to the Bayes Optimal in the Large Sample Limit
Let µ denote a distribution on labeled examples Rd×[C] and fix a norm on Rd. What is the true
objective of a robust classifier? Prior work measures the astuteness with respect to µ, which is
the accuracy at points for which the classifier is robust to bounded perturbations [43, 61].
Definition 3. For distribution µ on X × [C], the astuteness of a classifier f at radius r is
astµ(f, r) := Pr
(x,y)∼µ
[ρ(f,x) ≥ r and f(x) = y].
Our goal is to exbhibit a classifier, the r-Optimal classifier, that achieves optimal astuteness.
It will be convenient to rewrite astuteness in terms of certain robust subsets of the input space.
Then, we will define the r-Optimal classifier using these subsets. More formally, for a classifier f
and label j ∈ [C], define Sj(f, r) := {x ∈ R
d | f(x) = j and ρ(f,x) ≥ r}. The following lemma
expresses astuteness under µ using these subsets.
Lemma 1. astµ(f, r) =
∑C
j=1
∫
x∈Sj(f,r)
p(y = j | x)dµ.
Proof. Starting with the definition of astuteness, we compute the following.
astµ(f, r) = Pr
(x,y)∼µ
[ρ(f,x) ≥ r and f(x) = y]
=
∫
x
p(y | x) · 1{ρ(f,x)≥r} · 1{f(x)=y} dµ
=
C∑
j=1
∫
x
p(y = j | x) · 1{ρ(f,x)≥r} · 1{f(x)=j} dµ
=
C∑
j=1
∫
x∈Sj(f,r)
p(y = j | x) dµ.
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How should we define the classifier that maximizes astuteness? Lemma 1 implies that, to
calculate astuteness, it suffices to consider the robust regions Sj(f, r) for a classifier. As a
consequence, we claim that in order to determine the optimal classifier, it suffices to find the
optimal robust regions under µ. We first formalize this intermediate goal using the following
maximization problem.
max
S1,...,SC
C∑
j=1
∫
x∈Sj
p(y = j | x)dµ subject to d(Sj , Sj′) ≥ 2r for all j 6= j
′, (2)
where d(Sj , Sj′) := minu∈Sj ,v∈Sj′ ‖u − v‖. We observe that the sets Sj(f, r) have pairwise
distance at least 2r, which implies that they are feasible for the above maximization problem.
Lemma 2. For any classifier f and any pair of distinct labels j 6= j′, we have that
d(Sj(f, r), Sj′(f, r)) ≥ 2r.
Proof. Recall that we have fixed a norm ‖ · ‖ on Rd for this section. Consider two points
u ∈ Sj(f, r) and v ∈ Sj′(f, r). We claim that the balls of radius r around u and v must be
disjoint (with distance measured in the norm). To see this, consider the line segment between
them w = λu + (1 − λ)v, for λ ∈ [0, 1]. By definition of the robustness radius, we know that
f(w) = f(u) = j whenever ‖w − u‖ ≤ r. Similarly, f(w) = f(v) = j′ whenever ‖w − v‖ ≤ r.
Therefore, we must have that ‖u − v‖ ≥ 2r. As u and v were an arbitrary pair of points in
Sj(f, r) and Sj′(f, r), these subsets have distance at least 2r, and this holds for all j 6= j
′.
We will use an optimal solution to the maximization problem (2) to define the r-Optimal
classifier. Besides being distance 2r apart, an optimal solution S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
C to (2) will maximize
accuracy in the following sense. The integral measures the probability that (x, y) ∼ µ has
y = j and x ∈ S∗j . In other words, S
∗
j has the highest frequency of points with label j under
µ, subject to the distance constraint. The sets S∗j form the basis for the optimal classifier’s
decision regions. To ensure the separation, we consider the distance r ball around these sets.
More precisely, we have the following.
Definition 4. Fix r and µ. Let S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
C be optimizers of (2). The r-Optimal classifier fropt
is any classifier such that fropt(x) = j whenever d(x, S
∗
j ) ≤ r.
Notice that when r = 0, the 0-Optimal classifier is the standard Bayes Optimal classifier.
Also, note that for certain distributions µ, it could be the case that S∗j = ∅ for some j. For
example, this may happen if the training labels are highly imbalanced. In these cases, the
r-Optimal classifier may simply never output label j. On the other hand, the definition does
not enforce this, and the classifier may output label j on points that have distance at least r
from all sets S∗j′ for j
′ 6= j. This flexibility also arises in the definition of the standard Bayes
Optimal; it may output anything outside the support of the distribution.
Finally, we prove that that r-Optimal classifier maximizes astuteness.
Theorem 2. The r-optimal classifier maximizes astuteness at radius r under µ,
fropt = argmaxf astµ(f, r).
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Proof. By definition, fropt(x) = j whenever d(S
∗
j ,x) ≤ r. In other words, S
∗
j = Sj(fropt, r).
Using Lemma 1, we now compute the following.
astµ(f, r) =
C∑
j=1
∫
x∈Sj(f,r)
p(y = j | x) dµ
≤
C∑
j=1
∫
x∈S∗j
p(y = j | x) dµ
=
C∑
j=1
∫
x∈Sj(fropt ,r)
p(y = j | x) dµ
= astµ(fropt, r).
The inequality uses Lemma 2, which says that the sets Sj(f, r) for j ∈ [C] have pairwise distance
at least 2r. Hence, they are feasible for (2), which has optimal solution S∗j = Sj(fropt, r).
The practical drawback of the r-Optimal classifier is that it requires knowledge of the robust
regions under µ, which can only be computed in the large sample limit. To circumvent this, we
propose a finite-sample approach that approximates fropt by using a non-parametric classifier.
3.2 Generic Non-Parametric Defense Method
We use the r-Optimal classifier to motivate a general, practical defense. The challenge is that
real datasets will likely contain nearby points with different labels. What if we could pre-
process the training set so that differently-labeled points are distance at least 2r apart? This
may give us a good approximation to the optimal sets S∗j . To prune the dataset S, we solve
the maximization problem:
max
S1,...,SC⊆S
C∑
j=1
∑
xi∈Sj
1{yi=j} subject to d(Sj , Sj′) ≥ 2r for all j 6= j
′. (3)
The solution to (3) will be maximal subsets of training data with pairwise distance 2r. As
long as the training set S is representive of the underlying distribution µ, these subsets will
approximate the optimal S∗j sets. Then, we can train a non-parametric classifier on the pruned
dataset, and this should approximate the r-Optimal classifier. More specifically, we propose the
following defense method.
Adversarial Pruning. Given r and S, compute a maximal subset SAP ⊆ S such that
differently-labeled points have distance at least 2r. Train a non-parametric classifier on SAP.
For binary labels, the maximal subset SAP can be computed in polynomial time via maximal
bipartite vertex cover; for C ≥ 3, it is NP-Hard to compute the optimal pruned subset, but
approximation algorithms are known [38, 61]. We note that adversarial pruning may be an
effective defense even for large training sets, because using a nearly-maximal subset would
likely suffice to improve robustness.
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We posit that a nonparametric method trained on SAP will approximate the r-Optimal
classifier. While we do not know how to test this directly, in the next section, we empirically
evaluate the astuteness and robustness of the resulting classifiers against adversarial attacks.
4 Experiments
We now investigate the effectiveness of our proposed methods by evaluating multiple classifiers
on nine datasets. In particular, we address the following questions:
• How well does the region-based attack perform compared with prior work?
• Does adversarial pruning increase robustness across multiple non-parametric classifiers?
• Finally, is adversarial pruning effective for parametric classifiers as well?
4.1 Experimental Setup
Classifiers and Datasets. We evaluate three non-parametric classifiers: k-nearest neighbor
(k-NN), decision tree (DT) and random forest (RF) [7, 8, 20]. Additionally, to demonstrate
the difference between parametrics and non-parametrics, we consider two parametric models:
logistic regression (LR) and a two-layer perceptron (MLP). We use nine binary classification
datasets from libsvm, UCI, and other publicly available databases [13, 24, 62, 40]. Features
are scaled to be in [0,1]. More details about the experiments appear in Appendix B, and the
code can be found in a public repository.1
Performance Measures. Despite the wealth of adversarial example research, there is no
consensus on best performance metric [11]. Besides measuring accuracy, we evaluate attacks
using empirical robustness, following prior work [15, 34]. The empirical robustness for attack A
on f at input x is ER(A, f,x) := ‖x − x˜A‖∞, where A outputs x˜A as the adversarial example
for f at x. Observe that larger empirical robustness means worse attacks, and the minimal
empirical robustness of f at x is the robustness radius ρ(f,x). To fairly compare classifiers
having different accuracies, we actually compute ER(A, f, S, t) over t test inputs. To do so, we
draw t random samples St from S that are classified correctly by f , and we report the average
of ER(A, f,x) over x ∈ St. We set t = 100.
Each defense method D produces a classifier fD. We evaluate a defense D by assigning it a
score, the defscore. The defscore with respect to an attack A, a test set S and test size t is the
ratio
defscore(D,A, f, S, t) =
ER(A, fD, S, t)
ER(A, f, S, t)
,
where f is the undefended classifier. A larger defscore implies a better defense. Whenever
feasible, we use the optimal attack while calculating the defscore.
1https://github.com/yangarbiter/adversarial-nonparametrics/tree/arxiv
10
1-NN 3-NN DT RF
Direct BBox Kernel RBA-Exact Direct BBox Kernel RBA-Approx Papernot’s BBox RBA-Exact BBox RBA-Approx
australian .442 .336 .379 .151 .719 .391 .464 .278 .140 .139 .070 .364 .446
cancer .223 .364 .358 .137 .329 .376 .394 .204 .459 .334 .255 .451 .383
covtype .320 .207 .271 .076 .443 .265 .271 .120 .289 .117 .070 .256 .219
diabetes .074 .112 .165 .035 .130 .143 .191 .078 .237 .133 .085 .181 .184
f-mnist06 .259 .162 .187 .034 .233 .184 .213 .064 .200 .182 .114 .222 .199
f-mnist35 .354 .269 .288 .089 .355 .279 .295 .111 .287 .168 .112 .201 .246
fourclass .109 .124 .137 .090 .101 .113 .134 .096 .288 .197 .137 .159 .133
halfmoon .070 .129 .102 .059 .105 .132 .115 .096 .098 .148 .085 .182 .149
mnist17 .330 .260 .239 .079 .302 .264 .247 .098 .236 .175 .117 .237 .244
Table 1: Empirical Robustness for attacks on four classifiers (lower is better; best in bold).
Attack Algorithms. For 1-NN and DT, we apply the exact region-based attack (RBA-
Exact). For 3-NN and RF, the RBA-Exact attack is computationally intensive, and we use
the approximate region-based attack (RBA-Approx). For 3-NN, it uses s′ = 50 polyhedra,
and for RF, it uses s′ = 100 polyhedra. For LR and MLP, we evaluate a standard base-
line, the projected gradient descent (PGD) attack [43]. For the non-parametrics, we compare
RBA-Exact and RBA-Approx against several baselines. A general attack that applies to all
methods is the black-box attack (BBox) [18]; this attack seems to be the state-of-the-art for
non-parametrics [16, 18], better than other black-box attacks [9, 49].
For k-NN, we compare against two white-box attacks, the direct attack (Direct) and kernel
substitution attack (Kernel) [48, 61]. The direct attack perturbs the test instance towards the
center of the k nearest oppositely-labeled training examples. The kernel substitution attack
uses a soft nearest neighbor to build a substitution model, and then applies PGD.
For DT, the RBA-Exact attack is optimal, and so is the attack by Kantchelian et. al.
[34]; we only report RBA-Exact because these achieve the same results. We also evaluate the
heuristic DT attack by Papernot et. al. [48]. For RF, both optimal attacks are computationally
infeasible, and we only evaluate BBox and RBA-Approx.
Defense Methods. For our defense, we train each classifier on the dataset pre-processed
with adversarial pruning (AP); we use ℓ∞ to determine the nearby examples to prune. For the
separation parameter r of AP, we performed a parameter sweep and found that r = 0.3 balances
robustness versus accuracy. We set r = 0.3 for all datasets (see Appendix B.4 for the results
for other r settings).
A generic baseline is adversarial training (AT), where the training data is augmented with
examples generated by the corresponding attack algorithm. AT has been reported to be in-
effective for 1-NN and boosted decision tree [15, 61], but for completeness, we include it for
comparison. For AT of non-parametrics, we retrain the classifier after attacking each training
point once; for AT of parametrics, we follow the Cleverhans implementation [46]. We augment
the training data with adversarial examples that are distance at most 0.3 from the original
input. The parameter 0.3 matches the parameter r for AP. For 1-NN, an available baseline
defense is Wang et. al. [61], but for general k-NN, we are not aware of other defenses.
For DT and RF, we compare against the best known defense algorithm, Robust Splitting
(RS) [15]. We set the RS parameter to 0.3 as well.
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1-NN 3-NN DT RF LR MLP
AT Wang’s AP AT AP AT RS AP AT RS AP AT AP AT AP
australian 0.64 1.65 1.65 0.68 1.20 2.36 5.86 2.37 1.07 1.12 1.04 5.38 1.24 8.61 2.35
cancer 0.82 1.05 1.41 1.06 1.39 0.85 1.09 1.19 0.87 1.54 1.26 2.17 0.99 2.72 1.08
covtype 0.61 3.17 3.17 0.81 2.55 1.07 2.90 4.84 0.93 1.59 2.10 8.44 1.56 11.50 2.94
diabetes 0.83 4.69 4.69 0.87 2.97 0.93 1.53 2.22 1.19 1.25 2.22 4.43 2.46 5.31 2.13
f-mnist06 0.94 2.09 2.12 0.86 1.47 0.82 3.91 1.85 0.97 1.17 1.81 3.53 1.50 2.59 2.46
f-mnist35 0.80 1.02 1.08 0.77 1.05 1.11 2.64 2.07 0.90 1.23 1.32 3.05 1.21 3.94 1.27
fourclass 0.93 3.09 3.09 0.89 3.09 1.06 1.23 3.04 1.03 1.92 3.59 1.80 1.33 3.09 2.35
halfmoon 1.03 1.98 2.73 0.93 1.92 1.54 1.98 2.58 1.04 1.01 1.82 1.06 1.06 1.44 1.47
mnist17 0.78 1.01 1.20 0.81 1.13 1.14 2.91 1.54 0.93 1.11 1.29 3.42 1.35 1.51 1.29
Table 2: The defscore of four non-parametrics and two parametrics, using different defenses (higher
is better; best is in bold). The defscore for undefended classifiers is always 1.00 by definition. A
number greater than one indicates that the defense yields a more robust classifier, while less than one
indicates less robust. We use RBA-Exact for 1-NN and DT, and RBA-Approx for 3-NN and RF, and
PGD for LR and MLP.
4.2 Results and Discussion
We separately evaluate attacks and defenses. The results appear in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
We provide a more fine-grained accuracy vs. perturbation distance experiment in Figure 1.
Effectiveness of Attack Methods. Table 1 exhibits empirical robustness across four unde-
fended classifiers and nine datasets. Recall that a smaller empirical robustness implies a more
effective attack. For 1-NN, we see that RBA-Exact works as expected, achieving the smallest
empirical robustness. For 3-NN, our RBA-Approx attack is more effective than prior attacks,
with a much lower empirical robustness. This indicates that RBA-Approx can be a strong attack
for k > 1, where previously no consistently effective baseline was known. For DT, RBA-Exact
again has the best performance. The 2-3x factor improvement in many cases shows that the
optimal attack for 1-NN and DT can be significantly better than heuristics, which will lead to
a more informative defense evaluation. For RF, RBA-Approx wins on five of the nine datasets,
and BBox wins on four. The results demonstrate that our RBA-Approx attack is competitive
with the state-of-the-art for RF, and better for 3-NN.
Effectiveness of Defense Methods. Table 2 shows defscore across classifiers (four non-
parametric, two parametric) and several defense methods. We emphasize that for each of the
nine datasets, the AP defense trains all six classifiers on the same pruned version of the dataset.
For both parametric and non-parametric classifiers, we see that AP results in a greater than
one defscore, indicating that classifiers trained with AP are more robust. In contrast, for non-
parametrics, AT usually achieves defscore less than one, worse than the undefended classifier;
this corroborates previous results [61, 15]. We elaborate on the parametric results later in this
section. For 1-NN, observe that AP is slightly better than the defense of Wang et. al. [61]. We
believe that this is because their method converges to Bayes Optimal, while AP approximates
the r-Optimal classifier. For the DT and RF experiments, we see that RS and AP perform
competitively, each winning out on some datasets. Overall, AP performs slightly better than
RS. We remark that we have evaluated 1-NN and DT against the optimal attack. This provides
concrete evidence that AP really does lead to a more robust classifier.
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Figure 1: Accuracy (y-axis) vs. perturbation distance (x-axis) for four classifiers (larger accuracy
is better). Top row dataset is f-mnist06 (subfigures (a)-(d)), and bottom row dataset is diabetes
(subfigures (e)-(h)). The other seven datasets appear in Appendix B.4.1. In the legend, Reg. stands for
regular (undefended) classifier; AP for adversarial pruning; and, RS for robust splitting.
Accuracy vs. Perturbation Distance. Figure 1 shows the accuracy of classifiers as the
perturbation distance of the adversarial examples varies from 0.0 to 0.8. The value at 0.0 is
the non-adversarial accuracy on the test set. As the distance increases to 0.8, the accuracy
drops to zero, since adversarial examples are found for all test instances. For 1-NN and DT,
we use the optimal attack RBA-Exact, and therefore, the figure actually reports the astuteness
(Definition 3) of each defended and undefended classifier, when the astuteness radius r varies.
For 3-NN and RF, we use RBA-Approx; as we have previously shown that this attack is effective,
we see that AP produces a more robust classifier at most perturbation distances. For DT and
RF, we also compare against the RS defense. We see that AP and RS are competitive, with
AP being better in three cases when the perturbation is larger. The figure also illuminates the
general trade-off between being robust and being accurate. The defended classifiers usually start
out with an accuracy slightly lower, but they are able to retain more of their accuracy as the
perturbation distance increases. The drop in accuracy of AP is comparable with competitors,
showing that the accuracy sacrificed for robustness is within a reasonable range.
Parametrics vs. Non-Parametrics. Table 2 also contains the defscore of AT and AP for the
two parametric classifiers LR and MLP. We see that AT performs well. Surprisingly, AP also
moderately increases robustness. Looking into the results, the undefended parametric classifiers
seem more susceptible to nearby adversarial examples. For example, we might conclude that
AT works extremely well on the covtype dataset, since the defscore is so high for parametrics.
However, undefended 1-NN and DT have empirical robustness of .076 and .070, respectively,
whereas undefended LR and MLP have only .025 and .016, respectively. Also, the PGD attack
is not necessarily optimal, while RBA-Exact is optimal. Thus, in this case, the increase in
defscore for parametrics is mostly due to the original vulnerability. Overall, there are many
intriguing aspects to explore about the differences between parametrics and non-parametrics.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider adversarial examples for non-parametric methods, with a focus on
generic attacks and defenses. We provide a new attack, the region-based attack, which applies
to a wide range of classifiers; and, we exhibit a new method of defense, the adversarial pruning
defense, which also applies broadly. Our defense is motivated by a novel robust analogue of the
Bayes Optimal classifier, which we also introduce. On the theory side, we prove that the region-
based attack outputs the optimal adversarial example, and the r-Optimal classifier maximizes
astuteness. On the experimental side, we demonstrate that both the region based attack and
adversarial pruning defense are better than or competitive with previous attacks and defenses,
while being considerably more general.
Our results raise many interesting questions about adversarial examples, especially the dif-
ferences between parametric and non-parametric methods. For example, why does adversarial
training help parametrics, while it hinders non-parametrics? Is it possible to develop a unified
attack or defense framework that works for both parametric and non-parametric methods? If
not, are there fundamental reasons why these two learning paradigms should behave differ-
ently with respect to adversarial examples? We leave answers to these questions as compelling
directions for future work.
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A Attack Algorithm: Theoretical Results and Omitted Proofs
In this section, we analyze the exact and approximate region-based attacks. To do so, we
provide details about the decompositions for k-NN and tree ensemble classifiers. We also prove
Theorem 1 in general, and we give a corollary for the classifiers that we consider. Finally, we
discuss our approximate attack, providing more details and an analysis.
Before getting into these details, we observe that our attack actually holds for the more
general class of linear decision trees, which we now define.
Defining Linear Decision Trees
A linear decision tree is a binary tree consisting of (i) internal nodes associated with affine
functions and (ii) leaf nodes associated with labels in [C]. The value f(x) is determined by
following the root to a leaf, going left or right depending on whether x satisfies or violates the
linear constraint in the current node; then, f(x) is the label of the leaf. Such trees generalize
(standard) decision trees, which restrict each constraint to depend on a single variable.
An ensemble of linear decision trees is collection of trees with the modification that the
leaves are labeled with vectors in RC . The value f(x) is determined by a two-stage process.
First, find the root-to-leaf path associated with each tree separately, resulting in a collection of
vectors u1, . . . ,uT ∈ RC , where T is the number of trees. Then, letting u = u1 + · · ·+ uT , the
output f(x) equals the index of the largest coordinate i ∈ [C] in the vector u. Note that for
binary labels, this is equivalent to the definition of having scalar leaf labels and outputting the
sign of the sum.
A.1 Decompositions for Specific Classifiers
We now describe the decompositions for tree ensembles and k-NN. Parameters for the decom-
positions will directly determine the running time of the optimal attack algorithm.
Decomposition for Tree Ensembles
Lemma 3. If f is an ensemble of T linear decision trees, each with depth at most D and with
at most L leaves, then f is (LT , TD)-decomposable.
Proof. We first describe the decomposition for a single tree, then generalize to an ensemble of
trees. Let T be a linear decision tree with depth D leaves (ℓ1, ℓ2, . . . , ℓm). The polyhedron Pi
will be the set of z that reach leaf ℓi in T . The hyperplane description for Pi can be computed
as follows. Each internal node v from the root of T to the leaf ℓi contains a linear constraint
av(z) ≤ bv. On the path to ℓi, group all the violated (resp. satisfied) constraints av, bv as rows
of the matrix A− and entries of the vector b− (resp. A+ and b+). Then, all z that reach ℓi
are exactly the vectors that satisfy A−z > b− and A+z ≤ b+. Therefore, these at most D
constraints determine Pi precisely.
Now, consider ensembles of T trees with depth at most D and at most L leaves. The
polyhedra correspond to combinations of one leaf from each tree. Each leaf contributes at most
D constraints, for at most TD total constraints. There are at most LT choices for one leaf from
each of T trees.
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Decomposition for k-NN
The decomposition for k-NN is a standard fact, known as the kth-order Voronoi diagram, and it
is a classical result in machine learning and computational geometry (see for example Chapter
12 in the book [44], or the survey [4], or the paper [45]). We sketch a proof for completeness.
Lemma 4. If f is a k-NN classifier for a dataset of size n, then f is (
(
n
k
)
, k(n−k))-decomposable.
Proof. (Sketch). Let S be the training dataset on n points. We define
(
n
k
)
convex polyhedra,
one for each subset U ⊆ S containing |U | = k points. The polyhedron PU is the subset of R
d
such that if z ∈ PU , then the k nearest neighbors to z from the dataset S in the ℓ2 distance are
the k points in U . By definition, the k-NN classifier will be constant on each polyhedron PU ,
as the output label is completely determined by the k nearest neighbors for z, which is the set
U .
We show that PU can be defined by k(n − k) hyperplanes as follows. For each of the k
points x ∈ U , we use the (n − k) bisecting hyperplanes separating x from each of the n − k
points not in U (that is, separating x from the points S \ U). This is a total of k(n− k) linear
constraints, and we define PU as the intersection of these k(n − k) halfspaces. Clearly, PU is a
convex polyhedron.
To see the nearest neighbor property, consider any z ∈ PU . For every x ∈ U , the constraints
defining PU include the (n − k) bisecting hyperplanes that separate x from the n − k points
outside of U . In particular, z is closer to x than to these n−k other points. To put this another
way, z is in the Voronoi cell for x in the reduced dataset consisting only of x and the other
n − k points (that is, x ∪ (S \ U)). As this is true for each of the k points in U , we have that
z is closer to each of the k points in U than to the other n− k points. Therefore, we conclude
that U consists of the k nearest neighbors to z.
A.2 Analyzing the Region-Based Attack
We have just shown that f is decomposable when it is the classifier determined by k-NN or a
linear decision tree (or, more generally, an ensemble of linear decision trees). The consequence
of this is that Theorem 1 implies an efficient and optimal algorithm for a wide-range of non-
parametric classifiers. We first discuss the specific convex programs, then finish the proof of
the theorem.
Norms as Convex Objectives
Recall that if a classifier is (s,m)-decomposable, then there exists s polyhedra P1, . . . , Ps such
that each Pi is the intersection of at most m halfspaces. Moreover, the classifier is constant on
each of these convex regions, predicting label yi at all points in Pi.
For an input x, let Ix be the indices of polyhedra Pi such that f(x) 6= yi. Then, the region-
based attack optimizes over all polyhedra Pi for i ∈ Ix by solving the inner minimization of
Equation (1), namely
min
z∈Pi
‖x− z‖p. (4)
Given that Pi is a polyhedron, the constraint z ∈ Pi can be expressed using the m linear
constraints that define Pi. Then, the norm minimization can be expressed as a convex objective.
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In particular, the problem (4) can be solved with a linear program for p ∈ {1,∞} or a quadratic
program for p = 2 using standard techniques [6]. The following are the specific LP formulations
for p ∈ {1,∞}.
ℓ∞ norm. Let t ∈ R be single variable. When p =∞, the problem in (4) can be solved in R
d
using the following linear program with d+ 1 variables and m+ 2d linear constraints.
minimize
z,t
t
subject to z ∈ Pi
(z− x)j ≤ t ∀ j ∈ [d]
(z− x)j ≥ −t ∀ j ∈ [d]
(5)
ℓ1 norm. Let t ∈ R
d be vector. When p = 1, the problem in (4) can be solved in Rd using
the following linear program with 2d variables and m+ 2d linear constraints.
minimize
z,t
1T t
subject to z ∈ Pi
(z− x)j ≤ tj ∀ j ∈ [d]
(z− x)j ≥ −tj ∀ j ∈ [d]
(6)
Finishing the Analysis of the Exact Region-Based Attack
Proof of Theorem 1. We first claim that the attack produces the optimal adversarial example
when f is any (s,m)-decomposable classifier. By assumption, there is a partition of Rd into
polyhedra P1, . . . , Ps such that f is constant on each Pi region. Let yi be the label that f gives
to all points in Pi for each i ∈ [s]. On input x, the algorithm considers i ∈ Ix, where Ix ⊆ [s]
are the indices such that f(x) 6= yi. Thus, the point z
i ∈ Pi closest to x will have
f(zi) = yi 6= f(x).
Finally, the algorithm’s output is
argmin
{zi|i∈Ix}
‖zi − x‖.
As the regions Pi partition R
d, this is the closest point to x receiving a different label under f .
We now analyze the running time. For the ℓp distance, p ∈ {1, 2,∞}, finding each candidate
point zi requires solving a convex program with O(m) constraints and O(d) variables. This
can be done in poly(d,m) time using standard optimization techniques (e.g., the interior point
method). The number of convex programs is |Ix| ≤ s. Therefore, the total running time is at
most s · poly(d,m).
We specialize the above theorem to ensembles of linear decision trees and the k-NN classifier.
Corollary 1. Let n be the size of the training set. If f : Rd → [C] is a classifier determined
by k-NN with k = O(1) or an ensemble of O(1) linear decision trees with depth poly(n) and
poly(n) total leaves, then the region-based attack outputs the optimal adversarial example in
time poly(d, n).
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Proof. When f is an ensemble of T linear decision trees, each with depth D and L leaves,
Lemma 3 implies that f is (LT , TD)-decomposable. Assuming that T is a constant and L and
D are polynomial means that f is (poly(n),poly(n))-decomposable. Applying Theorem 1, the
running time of the exact region-based attack is thus poly(d, n).
When f is the k-NN classifier, Lemma 4 implies that f is (
(
n
k
)
, k(n− k))-decomposable. As-
suming that k is a constant means that f is (poly(n), O(n))-decomposable. Applying Theorem 1,
the running time of the exact region-based attack is thus poly(d, n).
We leave it as an interesting open question to develop provably optimal algorithms with
better running time. For example, in the case of large tree ensembles, the attack searches over
all combinations of one leaf from each tree. This seems wasteful, as many of these polyhedra
may be empty (in fact, we find that most potential regions are infeasible for random forests
trained on real datasets).
B More Experimental Details
The experiments were run on Intel Core i7-9700K 3.6 GHz 8-Core Processor, 32 GB RAM.
B.1 Classifier Implementation Details
The implementation for DT, RF and k-NN are based on scikit-learn [52]. For k-NN, the
distance metric is set to euclidean distance (ℓ2). For DT and RF, the splitting criterion is set to
“entropy”. For computational efficiency, we fixed the maximum depth of DT and RF to be five.
We implemented LR and MLP with keras [19] and tensorflow [1]. For training of LR and
MLP, we used the Nesterov Adam optimizer [23] and ran for 2000 epochs. For reproducibility,
all other hyper-parameters were set to the default settings of the implementation.
B.2 Attack and Defense Implementation Details
For kernel substitution attack, we set the approximation parameter c = 1.0, and we attack
the substitution model with Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [43]. For both Region-Based
Attacks (RBA-Exact and RBA-Approx), the underlying LP solver is Gurobi [29]. For the attack
on LR and MLP, we use PGD implemented in Cleverhans [46]. The implementation of the
black-box attack by Cheng et. al. (BBox) [18] is provided by authors in their public repository.2
For k-NN, we do not compare with the recent gradient-based extension [57] attack because
this algorithm only works if k-NN uses the cosine distance instead of ℓ2 distance (i.e., we do
not normalize the features).
B.3 Dataset Details
Table 3 lists dataset statistics. For each dataset, we reserved 200 examples for testing. We evalu-
ate the overall accuracy on these 200 examples. To compute empirical robustness ER(A, fD, S, t)
and defscore(D,A, f, S, t), we randomly select 100 correctly predicted examples for each classi-
fier. For efficiency purposes, the feature dimension for fashion-mnist (f-mnist), mnist has been
2https://github.com/cmhcbb/attackbox
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reduced to 25 using principle component analysis (PCA). For k-NN evaluations, we subsampled
certain datasets. The original f-mnist and mnist dataset are sub-sampled to 2200 examples,
and covtype is sub-sampled to 1200 examples. For other classifiers, we use 10200 examples.
Recall that mnist17 represents a subset of mnist dataset for the binary classification problem
distinguishing between 1 and 7. Similarly, f-mnist35 is the task of distinguishing between the
3rd and 5th class, and f-mnist06 is the task of distinguishing between the 0th and 6th class.
The features are scaled to [0, 1] so that the LP solver will avoid numerical rounding errors.
# training
(1-NN, 3-NN)
# training
(DT, RF, LR,
MLP)
# testing
(perturbation)
# testing
(test
accuracy)
# features # classes
australian 490 490 100 200 14 2
fourclass 662 662 100 200 2 2
diabetes 568 568 100 200 8 2
cancer 483 483 100 200 10 2
halfmoon 2000 2000 100 200 2 2
covtype 1000 10000 100 200 54 2
f-mnist35 2000 10000 100 200 25 2
f-mnist06 2000 10000 100 200 25 2
mnist17 2000 10000 100 200 25 2
Table 3: Dataset statistics.
B.4 Additional Experiment Results
Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 show additional experiment results with adversarial pruning (AP) as
the defense method, for different classifiers. We remark that sometimes AP removes too many
examples. In these cases, we mark the entry as ‘-’ in the table. Specifically, for AP with
separation parameter r = 0.5, the adversarial pruned datasets become highly unbalanced in
label (e.g., sometimes only one label remains). we will put the value ‘-’ in the table whenever
the training accuracy goes below 0.5 or the classifier outputs only one label,
In addition to nonparametrics, Table 10 and 11 list some additional experimental results
with adversarial training (AT) as the defense method for LR and MLP.
Notice that the testing accuracy remains reasonable, even when the pruned datasets have
relatively few training examples left. This serves as a sanity check that we are not giving away
all of the accuracy for robustness.
Recall that higher empirical robustness means that the classifier is more robust to the given
attack. In other words, if an attack leads to a lower empirical robustness, then it is a better
attack. On the other hand, when considering the strength of a defense method, a higher defscore
means that the defense is better.
B.4.1 Defense figures
Figures 2 and 3 show the complete experiment results (on all nine datasets) for the experimental
results presented in Figure 1. The accuracy (y-axis) is measured on the 200 testing examples
reserved initially.
B.5 Images Removed by AP
Figure 4 shows examples of images removed by AP and their closest opposite labeled images.
In the case of mnist17, it is interesting to note that the sevens and ones do resemble each other,
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1-NN AP ( r=.1) AP ( r=.3) AP ( r=.5)
ER
test
accuracy
# train ER
test
accuracy
# train defscore ER
test
accuracy
# train defscore ER
test
accuracy
# train defscore
australian .151 .805 490 .162 .800 484 1.073 .249 .820 458 1.649 .311 .825 427 2.060
cancer .137 .950 483 .137 .950 483 1.000 .193 .950 473 1.409 .261 .965 458 1.905
covtype .076 .670 1000 .079 .680 977 1.039 .241 .680 724 3.171 .330 .710 695 4.342
diabetes .035 .695 568 .035 .700 535 1.000 .164 .660 379 4.686 .375 .660 370 10.714
f-mnist06 .034 .790 2000 .037 .790 1993 1.088 .072 .755 1354 2.118 - .450 1010 -
f-mnist35 .089 .990 2000 .089 .990 2000 1.000 .096 1.000 1803 1.079 .108 .980 1375 1.213
fourclass .090 1.000 662 .107 .960 559 1.189 .278 .750 453 3.089 - .565 442 -
halfmoon .059 .920 2000 .151 .915 1702 2.559 .161 .840 1144 2.729 - .480 1004 -
mnist17 .079 .995 2000 .079 .995 2000 1.000 .095 .975 1794 1.203 .116 .670 1030 1.468
Table 4: The number of training data left after adversarial pruning (AP), test accuracy, empirical
robustness, and defscore with different of AP for 1-NN.
3-NN AP ( r=.1) AP ( r=.3) AP ( r=.5)
ER
test
accuracy
# train ER
test
accuracy
# train defscore ER
test
accuracy
# train defscore ER
test
accuracy
# train defscore
australian .278 .805 490 .317 .810 484 1.140 .333 .815 458 1.198 .371 .825 427 1.335
cancer .204 .975 483 .204 .975 483 1.000 .283 .960 473 1.387 .350 .970 458 1.716
covtype .120 .690 1000 .127 .675 977 1.058 .306 .685 724 2.550 .375 .710 695 3.125
diabetes .078 .755 568 .078 .750 535 1.000 .232 .655 379 2.974 - .660 370 -
f-mnist06 .064 .795 2000 .064 .790 1993 1.000 .094 .730 1354 1.469 - .450 1010 -
f-mnist35 .111 .995 2000 .111 .995 2000 1.000 .117 .995 1803 1.054 .131 .975 1375 1.180
fourclass .096 .995 662 .127 .960 559 1.323 .297 .750 453 3.094 - .565 442 -
halfmoon .096 .940 2000 .159 .920 1702 1.656 .184 .845 1144 1.917 - .480 1004 -
mnist17 .098 .995 2000 .098 .995 2000 1.000 .111 .975 1794 1.133 .141 .655 1030 1.439
Table 5: The number of training data left after adversarial pruning (AP), test accuracy, empirical
robustness, and defscore with different of AP for 3-NN.
DT AP ( r=.1) AP ( r=.3) AP ( r=.5)
ER
test
accuracy
# train ER
test
accuracy
# train defscore ER
test
accuracy
# train defscore ER
test
accuracy
# train defscore
australian .070 .855 490 .194 .835 484 2.771 .166 .835 458 2.371 .450 .835 427 6.429
cancer .255 .930 483 .255 .930 483 1.000 .303 .965 473 1.188 .358 .960 458 1.404
covtype .070 .715 10000 .081 .710 8649 1.157 .339 .670 7054 4.843 .357 .670 7024 5.100
diabetes .085 .715 568 .085 .720 535 1.000 .189 .670 379 2.224 .378 .670 370 4.447
f-mnist06 .114 .815 10000 .107 .805 9665 .939 .211 .705 6149 1.851 - .490 5002 -
f-mnist35 .112 .995 10000 .112 .995 9999 1.000 .232 .900 8790 2.071 .285 .910 6871 2.545
fourclass .137 .900 662 .138 .910 559 1.007 .416 .680 453 3.036 - .565 442 -
halfmoon .085 .950 2000 .167 .895 1702 1.965 .219 .670 1144 2.576 - .480 1004 -
mnist17 .117 .985 10000 .123 .985 9996 1.051 .180 .975 8502 1.538 .294 .865 5062 2.513
Table 6: The number of training data left after adversarial pruning (AP), test accuracy, empirical
robustness, and defscore with different of AP for DT.
RF AP ( r=.1) AP ( r=.3) AP ( r=.5)
ER
test
accuracy
# train ER
test
accuracy
# train defscore ER
test
accuracy
# train defscore ER
test
accuracy
# train defscore
australian .446 .845 490 .426 .855 484 .955 .465 .840 458 1.043 .496 .835 427 1.112
cancer .383 .970 483 .383 .970 483 1.000 .481 .965 473 1.256 .496 .955 458 1.295
covtype .219 .705 10000 .253 .720 8649 1.155 .460 .665 7054 2.100 .481 .640 7024 2.196
diabetes .184 .755 568 .175 .740 535 .951 .409 .660 379 2.223 .710 .660 370 3.859
f-mnist06 .199 .795 10000 .197 .800 9665 .990 .361 .750 6149 1.814 - .490 5002 -
f-mnist35 .246 1.000 10000 .243 1.000 9999 .988 .325 .925 8790 1.321 .293 .910 6871 1.191
fourclass .133 .980 662 .181 .865 559 1.361 .478 .665 453 3.594 - .565 442 -
halfmoon .149 .930 2000 .198 .900 1702 1.329 .271 .755 1144 1.819 - .480 1004 -
mnist17 .244 .990 10000 .248 .990 9996 1.016 .315 .965 8502 1.291 .320 .860 5062 1.311
Table 7: The number of training data left after adversarial pruning (AP), test accuracy, empirical
robustness, and defscore with different of AP for RF.
and so it makes sense that they are close to the training boundary and should be pruned. For
the other datasets, recall that we first applied PCA, and therefore, these images are similar in
the resulting feature space.
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LR AP ( r=.1) AP ( r=.3) AP ( r=.5)
ER
test
accuracy
# train ER
test
accuracy
# train defscore ER
test
accuracy
# train defscore ER
test
accuracy
# train defscore
australian .092 .850 490 .095 .860 484 1.033 .114 .850 458 1.239 .158 .825 427 1.717
cancer .169 .970 483 .170 .970 483 1.006 .167 .970 473 .988 .194 .970 458 1.148
covtype .025 .690 10000 .025 .690 8649 1.000 .039 .695 7054 1.560 .042 .670 7024 1.680
diabetes .091 .725 568 .086 .715 535 .945 .224 .650 379 2.462 - .660 370 -
f-mnist06 .066 .795 10000 .067 .810 9665 1.015 .099 .745 6149 1.500 - .490 5002 -
f-mnist35 .094 1.000 10000 .094 1.000 9999 1.000 .114 .990 8790 1.213 .230 .910 6871 2.447
fourclass .213 .780 662 .243 .790 559 1.141 .283 .735 453 1.329 - .565 442 -
halfmoon .160 .850 2000 .164 .840 1702 1.025 .169 .815 1144 1.056 - .480 1004 -
mnist17 .074 .995 10000 .074 .995 9996 1.000 .100 .975 8502 1.351 .161 .795 5062 2.176
Table 8: The number of training data left after adversarial pruning (AP), test accuracy, empirical
robustness, and defscore with different of AP for LR.
MLP AP ( r=.1) AP ( r=.3) AP ( r=.5)
ER
test
accuracy
# train ER
test
accuracy
# train defscore ER
test
accuracy
# train defscore ER
test
accuracy
# train defscore
australian .046 .820 490 .051 .830 484 1.109 .108 .840 458 2.348 .203 .835 427 4.413
cancer .149 .970 483 .147 .970 483 .987 .161 .950 473 1.081 .245 .980 458 1.644
covtype .016 .860 10000 .020 .815 8649 1.250 .047 .695 7054 2.938 .045 .670 7024 2.812
diabetes .062 .725 568 .061 .755 535 .984 .132 .655 379 2.129 .225 .660 370 3.629
f-mnist06 .037 .805 10000 .035 .820 9665 .946 .091 .755 6149 2.459 - .490 5002 -
f-mnist35 .082 1.000 10000 .082 1.000 9999 1.000 .104 .990 8790 1.268 .212 .920 6871 2.585
fourclass .125 .880 662 .197 .870 559 1.576 .294 .745 453 2.352 - .565 442 -
halfmoon .115 .930 2000 .163 .855 1702 1.417 .169 .800 1144 1.470 - .480 1004 -
mnist17 .072 1.000 10000 .073 1.000 9996 1.014 .093 .975 8502 1.292 .173 .805 5062 2.403
Table 9: The number of training data left after adversarial pruning (AP), test accuracy, empirical
robustness, and defscore with different of AP for MLP.
LR AT (attack distance r=.1) AT (attack distance r=.3) AT (attack distance r=.5)
ER
test
accuracy ER
test
accuracy
defscore ER
test
accuracy
defscore ER
test
accuracy
defscore
australian .092 .850 .275 .830 2.989 .495 .825 5.380 .507 .825 5.511
cancer .169 .970 .247 .965 1.462 .366 .925 2.166 .466 .855 2.757
covtype .025 .690 .090 .630 3.600 .211 .540 8.440 .235 .540 9.400
diabetes .091 .725 .167 .745 1.835 .403 .665 4.429 - .660 -
f-mnist06 .066 .795 .188 .790 2.848 .233 .780 3.530 .231 .780 3.500
f-mnist35 .094 1.000 .222 .990 2.362 .287 .935 3.053 .278 .930 2.957
fourclass .213 .780 .219 .770 1.028 .383 .685 1.798 - .565 -
halfmoon .160 .850 .154 .855 .963 .170 .810 1.062 .173 .825 1.081
mnist17 .074 .995 .216 .980 2.919 .253 .955 3.419 .250 .955 3.378
Table 10: The testing accuracy, empirical robustness, and defscore with different attack distance of
adversarial training (AT) for LR.
MLP AT (attack distance r=.1) AT (attack distance r=.3) AT (attack distance r=.5)
ER
test
accuracy ER
test
accuracy
defscore ER
test
accuracy
defscore ER
test
accuracy
defscore
australian .046 .820 .190 .815 4.130 .396 .835 8.609 .454 .840 9.870
cancer .149 .970 .251 .960 1.685 .406 .960 2.725 .480 .940 3.221
covtype .016 .860 .130 .735 8.125 .184 .745 11.500 .177 .745 11.062
diabetes .062 .725 .141 .745 2.274 .329 .670 5.306 .147 .720 2.371
f-mnist06 .037 .805 .157 .790 4.243 .096 .820 2.595 .053 .845 1.432
f-mnist35 .082 1.000 .179 .990 2.183 .323 .915 3.939 .081 1.000 .988
fourclass .125 .880 .161 .870 1.288 .386 .705 3.088 .488 .625 3.904
halfmoon .115 .930 .171 .900 1.487 .166 .870 1.443 .151 .925 1.313
mnist17 .072 1.000 .169 .985 2.347 .109 .990 1.514 .079 .995 1.097
Table 11: The testing accuracy, empirical robustness, and defscore with different attack distance of
adversarial training (AT) for MLP.
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(t) Random forest
Figure 2: The maximum perturbation distance allowed versus accuracy.
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Figure 3: The maximum perturbation distance allowed versus accuracy.
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(a) mnist17 (b) mnist17 (c) mnist17 (d) mnist17
(e) f-mnist35 (f) f-mnist35 (g) f-mnist35 (h) f-mnist35
(i) f-mnist06 (j) f-mnist06 (k) f-mnist06 (l) f-mnist06
Figure 4: Examples of images removed by adversarial pruning (AP). The images removed are (a), (c),
(e), (g), (i), (k) and the images to its right are the closest image with opposite labeled. To interpret
the labels of these datasets, mnist17 is the task of classifying one versus seven, f-mnist35 is Dress versus
Sandal, and f-mnist06 is T-Shirt/top versus Shirt.
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